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Re-Reengineering the Dream: Agility as Competitive Adaptability 
 
Abstract 
Organizational adaptation and transformative change management in 
technology-based organizations is explored in the context of collaborative 
alliances.  A Re-reengineering approach is outlined in which a new Competitive 
Adaptability Five-Influences Analysis approach under conditions of collaborative 
alliance, is described as an alternative to Porter’s Five-Forces Competitive 
Rivalry Analysis model.   
 
Keywords 
Adaptability, competition, collaboration, disruptive technological change, 
reengineering, paradigm change, manufacturing. 
 
Introduction and the Problem Expressed 
The onset of the industrial age brought with it a significant shift in the range and 
level of skills and expertise required to design, develop and produce products of 
all kinds. The earlier individualistic artisan skills passed down through the ages 
from master to apprentice became increasingly irrelevant in the rush to 
manufacture en-masse. However, this very same displacement of the earlier 
artisan in turn led to a new form of master-apprentice relationship, a more 
mechanistic version largely premised on and formulated by the form and function 
of extant technology, rather than an adjustable continuum of established skills 
and expertise.  This new age put in place a continually rolling and ever changing 
expectation for ‘new technology’ and its associated set of specific technology 
focussed skills and expertise as core corporate competencies (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1990).   
 
Whilst continuous change in technology and the associated effects of technology 
shock (Dedola & Neri, 2006; Christiano, Eichenbaum & Vigfusson, 2003) are not 
new constructs, the reality of the industrial age was and is a continuing reduction 
in timeline for relevance and lifetime for a specific technology and the related 
skills and expertise base required for its effective implementation.  This, 
combined with increasing pressures for innovation (Tidd & Bessant, 2013) and at 
times severe impacts from both local and global economic environments (Hitt, 
Ireland & Hoskisson, 2011) raises serious challenges for contemporary 
management teams seeking to strategically position a company and its 
technology base advantageously, relative to its suppliers, competitors and 
customers, as well as in predictive readiness for future technological change and 
opportunistic adaptation.   
 
In effect, the life-cycle of a technology has become typically one of disruptive 
change and rapid adjustment, followed by a plateau as a particular technology or 
process captures and holds its position against minor challenges, eventually to 
be displaced by yet another alternative (Bower & Christensen, 1995).  The 
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continuing introduction of new engineering processes and smarter technology 
has in turn demanded more rapid response times across supply chains feeding 
continuing globalisation of industrial and commercial business.  Over time, this 
has inexorably led to a technology life-cycle that exhibits embedded disruption, 
rapid diffusion, increasing knowledge intensity, and a decreasing timeline from 
onset to demise and displacement, classic forms of Schumpeter’s ‘creative 
destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1950) and Christensen’s concept of ‘disruptive 
innovation’ (Christensen, 1997). The impact of such changing life-cycles can also 
be seen in the expanding array of product generations, with seemingly perpetual 
updates (a form of response to diffusion and increasing knowledge intensity) and 
the changing face of contemporary business models over the past decade. 
 
Today, these changes are reflected in demand for the new artisan skills of IT 
consciousness, social networking capabilities and presence, and in science and 
technology quarters, an increasing need to capture and apply breakthrough 
science in shrinking time-scales.  Whilst the world may seem a smaller place 
thanks to intelligent global network services and a plethora of smart IT and 
communications technology devices and social-media, the underlying reality is 
that it still takes time to conceive, design, develop, produce, commercialise and 
globalise a new technology, by which time it is already facing displacement!  
Such is the problem facing contemporary business and technology based 
organisations per se, in attempts to continually reengineer corporate and 
technology processes (Champy, 1995) in the face of continuing and at times 
seriously aggressive innovation and disruptive technological, operational, and 
process change (Hitt et al, 2011; Tidd & Bessant, 2013; White & Bessant, 2007).  
However, simply moving the corporate and production engineering deckchairs in 
an apparently perpetual dance does not in itself resolve such. It is here argued 
that continuing disruptive technological change necessitates radical revolutionary 
approaches by management to developing a more agile industrial sector and 
technologically potent economy. 
 
Case Study: Factories of the Future in the European Union 
In an exemplar (macro-level) approach to addressing the need for radical change 
and adaptation across industrial sectors, the European Union has taken up the 
challenge of moving European manufacturing industries into the ‘digital futures’ 
environment as a matter of urgency and with a particular emphasis on small and 
medium enterprises (SME’s).  The manufacturing sector is a significant 
component in the European Union’s overall economy, representing 21% of the 
European Union’s GDP and 20% of the European Union’s employment (Wray 
(2012). In recent years, the manufacturing and technology-based industry 
sectors across the European Union have suffered serious and continuing 
competition from Eastern Europe, North and South Asia, Africa and South 
America based manufacturers able to source low-cost labour and production 
technology. Collectively, these international competitors form a bloc commonly 
referred to as the BRICS countries or economies, specifically: Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa (Fifth BRICS Summit, 2013; Wray, 2012).  In 
response, the European Commission has outlined a clear intention to restructure 
and re-enervate advanced manufacturing industries across the European Union 
as a key enabler strategy for re-establishing European industrial leadership and 
economic competitiveness (Beernaert, 2012).   
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The European Commission has actioned this strategy in collaboration with 
European industry, through funding €1.2 billion across 2010-2013 for Public-
Private-Project research targeted at producing a mix of new technological fixes to 
long-standing (and increasing) systemic areas of concern affecting global 
competitiveness for the European Union’s industrial manufacturing sector 
(European Commission, 2012).  In summary these areas of concern reflect a 
need to redress the embedded affects resulting from long term evolution of: 
closed thinking, restrictive practices, resource-based decision making (for 
example: production techniques based only on access to low cost labour), and 
failure to pro-actively move toward a more service-oriented and knowledge 
driven economic environment and new organisational and informational 
architectures (Beernaert, 2012).   
 
The diverse nature of these areas of concern underwrites the complexity of 
identifying and addressing the many issues that confront organisations 
undergoing or facing a future of significant technological paradigmatic transition 
(Dosi, 1982; Geels, 2005).  In effect, the European Commission is preparing 
organisations across the European Union for transition to innovative and 
collaborative decision-making environments, as digital-assets-intense enterprises 
operating in digital factory environments (European Commission, 2012).  This will 
necessitate adapting systems, processes, procedures, organisational and 
structural relationships, whilst acquiring new technological skills and building new 
corporate competencies (Hamel & Prahalad, 1990, 1994).  In particular, there will 
be a further emphasis for radical-revolutionary change across all aspects of 
manufacturing.  This will be particularly so in the use of state-of-the-art 
information and communications technology (ICT), simulations systems, adaptive 
robotic manufacturing systems, and the introduction of new materials, products 
and services.  This is perceived by the European Commission as an essential 
condition for future growth and success in its manufacturing sector (European 
Commission, 2012).  This response by the European Union provides a unique 
opportunity to observe a major industry sector faced with the prospect of 
actioning extensive innovation and technological change or face inevitable 
demise.   
 
Whilst long overdue and necessarily a long-term strategic planning approach, the 
above European Union example of industry-wide transition is presented as that 
of a deterministic technology-driven or ‘technology push’ paradigm (in this case 
clearly a form of cybernetic determinism with its push for increasing complexity in 
technology base, particularly with regard to information and communications 
technology systems) plus a significant element of ‘market pull’ (as a form of naive 
expectancy, where the commercial requirement for  technological change is seen 
as being in response to a growing demand or explicitly defined need) 
(Cetindamar, Phaal & Probert, 2010).  In this regard, it appears that European 
Commission researchers have also made, at least in part, the essential 
connection between the technological imperative paradigm and the critical causal 
and affective socio-technical influences of the social structures and related 
human factors elements (Geels & Schot, 2007).  These will become critical to 
successful collaboration across multiple organizations and their array of 
technology platforms, infrastructures, organisational cultures, skills, 
competencies, knowledge management, communities of practice, policies, 
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product specific processes, Quality and service orientation (Coakes & Clarke, 
2011).   
 
The performance of European organisations undergoing such transitions and the 
engineering, technological, and knowledge management issues identified, are 
also directly relevant to future (and inevitable) such transitions across the global 
manufacturing sector.  This was recently highlighted in the Australian 
manufacturing context in the release of the following two government instituted 
reports: A report to the Victorian State Government Minister for Manufacturing, 
Exports and Trade, ‘A More Competitive Manufacturing Industry, New Directions 
for Industry Policy and Manufacturing’ (Department of Business and Innovation, 
2011); and a report to the Federal Minister for Industry and Innovation, ‘A Report 
from the Prime Minister’s Manufacturing Taskforce’ (DIISRTE, 2012). Among its 
many recommendations it specifically addresses urgently targeting adaptation of 
the Australian manufacturing sector to ensure future competitiveness and 
performance in the face of continuing global economic and technological change 
(DIISRTE, 2012).   
 
The Case for Re-Reengineering  
Whether or not European Union based organizations engaged in the Factories of 
the Future Public-Private-Projects, or Australian manufacturing enterprises, have 
demonstrated a new way of looking at, thinking about, and using technology and 
knowledge based systems, products, processes, and services, remains to be 
seen.  Similarly, whether or not their experience in instituting (inevitable) sector-
wide disruptive paradigmatic change can inform further adaptation in related 
industry sectors, must await both time and the evidence of observable outcomes.  
However, it is certainly possible to reflect on past experiences in wide-spread 
reengineering approaches to identify and apply associated theoretical 
perspectives to potential opportunities for adaptation and change in the current 
context.   
 
It matters little if a company is in Western or Eastern Europe, in the South 
Pacific, the Americas (North or South), the middle-East or South, or a rising 
‘dragon’ of greater Asia, the time approaches when industrial and business 
organisations alike must needs re-think, re-formulate, and effectively re-
reengineer organisational form, function, and process.  In a different Age, 
Scottish social philosopher and pioneer political economist Adam Smith, 
incorporated into his seminal work ‘The Wealth of Nations’ (circa 1776) a focus 
on individual skills and the division of labour as a basic paradigm for an effective 
industrial economy.  A stratagem taken up by Twentieth Century governments of 
developed industrial economies and their educational providers alike, to be re-
interpreted as a focus on development of vocational task-based ‘skills’ and skills-
based ‘competencies’ as central elements in  national agenda for sustainable 
economic success. Smith is likely to have agreed and disagreed, all at the same 
time!   
 
The increasing displacement of basic skills-based competencies across 
contemporary developed economies in favour of more ‘knowledge-based’ skills 
and competencies (Trappey & Trappey, 2010) is strongly challenging the 
fundamental basis of Smith’s paradigm as so commonly interpreted. For 
example, the latter decades of the Twentieth Century saw a number of artisan 
and production process-based activities outsourced to developing country 
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locations, a system whereby increasing labour costs in developed economies 
were offset by lower costs elsewhere.  Where artisan styled skills are still 
commonly applied, as is often the case in developing economies, they are 
primarily focussed on specific task-based activities in product design, production 
processes, or other explicitly defined areas of ‘trained’ behaviour.  Whereas, a 
knowledge-based economy invokes a new approach that expresses not only 
understandings of what is required and access to resources (including 
development, acquisition of, or access to relevant technology base) but also an 
advanced capacity to plan, create, implement and manage potentially disruptive 
processes (Hitt et al, 2011;Christensen & Raynor, 2003) that can strategically 
position a company (or nation for that matter) to capture and sustain market 
position (Johnson, Scholes, & Whittington, 2011).   
 
In the early 1990’s, Hammer and Champy (1993) and subsequently Champy 
(1995) and Hammer (1996) endeavoured to replace earlier attempts at re-
conceiving the form and function of organisational structures with a new 
emphasis towards understanding the processes that underpin industrial systems 
and business operations.  Their approach entailed a radical redesign of business 
processes using the concept of ‘business process reengineering’ (BPR).  Implicit 
in their construct of reengineering of contemporary industrial and business 
enterprises was the willingness and capability of an organisation to face endemic 
challenges and embrace radical change.  Some future focussed enterprises 
could and did, whilst others might have but did not.  Curiously, some who could 
and did, did not subsequently survive, whilst conversely, others who could not 
and did not, did survive! Hammer and Champy’s (1993) concept of reengineering 
was built on a construct of re-building and the literal re-booting of a company’s 
operational systems to envisage a virtual re-birthing of the enterprise, a classic 
vision of the re-birthed Phoenix rising from the ashes of its former self. 
 
Two decades later, post global financial crisis and the meltdown of government 
industrial policies, the demolition, dissolution, or rescue of major banking 
institutions, and the disappearance of multiple industrial and business 
corporations around the globe, industry and business face new challenges that 
again demand a radical shift in thinking and change in approach.  Just as earlier 
reengineering approaches envisaged the ‘re-birthing’ of an organisation, so also 
may we consider the potential for such occurrences in the current European 
Union and Australian manufacturing contexts, only at a much broader industry 
sector level. Hammer and Champy’s (1993) earlier model envisaged the 
organisation or enterprise largely as a bounded entity where the focus of the 
reengineering exercise was essentially to re-structure the organisation from the 
level of its products and processes upwards.  Get the process and its 
relationships with other processes right and the organisational structure and its 
required technology-base would logically follow.  Applying ‘Systems Thinking’ 
approaches to this (Checkland, 1999) it can be seen that identifying relationships 
and the connectedness or linkages between both corporate and technological 
processes, was a key element in the business of reengineering the 1990’s 
organisation.   
 
As an exemplar of twenty-first century thinking, the more recent European 
Commission analysis of manufacturing enterprises undertaken at industry sector 
level across the European Union (European Commission, 2012) clearly requires 
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a more macro level approach, referred to here as: Re-reengineering. Although 
still addressing the driving forces that engendered the original reengineering 
approach, Re-reengineering must now take the response well beyond the 
boundaries of the individual organization and its bounded set of products, 
processes, approach to design, production planning and technology base. 
Shifting thinking beyond the limitations of the individual enterprise both raises 
inherent barriers and extends opportunities for adaptation and fundamental 
change.  It also raises the potential to consider a more integrated (disruptive, yet 
less destructive) approach to the induction of paradigmatic change at both the 
individual enterprise and industry-wide levels. 
 
Just as Hammer and Champy’s (1993) earlier approach focused on the efficacy 
of the individual enterprise to understand it’s product and service processes 
needs, so also must a new Re-reengineering approach address and facilitate 
renewal in the individual enterprise, whilst doing so in a manner that also 
facilitates renewal in the external industry sector and it’s commercial, 
technological and social environment.  The European Union experience to date 
indicates that where shifts or new adaptations to current technological practice in 
an individual enterprise may provide initial or short-term competitive advantage, it 
is only through integration of such new practices across industry sectors that 
more broadly based and sustainable benefits can be achieved (European 
Commission, 2012).  
 
In effect, developing informed ‘communities of practice’ (Hernáez & Campos, 
2011) and enterprise-to-enterprise (including cross-sector) collaborative 
environments provides opportunity for value adding benefits, to the individual 
organization, its suppliers and customers, and the wider industry sector (Coakes, 
& Clarke, 2011).  A strategy premised on leveraging sector-wide performance 
enhancement, rather than a narrow approach creating bounded ‘silos’ of 
constrained access to new thematics and practice and focused only on the short-
term development and wishful sustainment of competitive rivalry (Lencioni, 
2006).  In turn, it evokes a strategy that replaces the short-term benefit of 
‘outsourcing’ production to low-cost sources, in order to focus more on creating 
inter-enterprise and cross-sector knowledge, skills and competencies that enable 
the development of smarter, more creative and adaptable design and production 
systems. 
 
The Case for Alternative Metrics 
This alternative approach challenges both Hammer and Champy’s (1993) narrow 
focus on the individual corporation, and potentially brings an alternative metric 
into the classic regime of strategic business analysis instruments.  Porter’s Five-
Forces analysis approach to building business strategy (Porter, 1980) through 
understanding the forces that impact on the enterprise, has been a dominant 
analysis tool across business and industry for three decades, with it’s centrality 
on determining  and building ‘competitive rivalry’ as a premier determinant of 
success (Johnson et al, 2011). (See Figure 1). 
 
Porter’s approach hinges on factoring in the influence of the four core elements 
that he perceived as critical to determining a measure of an enterprise’s 
‘Competitive Rivalry’:  the ‘Threat’ posed by potential new entrants; the ‘Threat’ 
posed by either existing or new substitutes; the ‘Bargaining Power’ of suppliers in 
the up-stream supply chain; and the ‘Bargaining Power’ of buyers and customers 
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(Porter, 1980). Collectively, both the intuitive perceptions and inferences arising 
from the language and suggested locus of associations being used in the 
analysis of these four core elements, invoke aggressive positioning relative to the 
fifth element as a measure of ‘Competitive Rivalry’.  In effect, Porter’s legacy has 
been that of a self-perpetuating logic of aggressively competitive rivalry. 
 
 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
 
In an industrial post global-economic-crisis environment, survival of the strongest 
and fittest, as typified by aggressive hyper-competitive rivalry (D’Aveni & 
Gunther, 1995) and rigorous pursuit of sustainable competitive advantage 
(Porter, 1979) is not necessarily the same as survival capacity for the agile, 
adaptive-collaborative capable enterprise (McGrath, 2013; Nalebuff & 
Brandenburger, 1997).  It is argued that, ‘Competitive Adaptability’ may well be 
an alternative metric for Porter’s ‘Competitive Rivalry’, or potentially the premise 
on which a whole new Competitive Adaptability Analysis approach could be 
developed.  In retrospect, Toffler (1985) identified the need for this potential shift 
when he referred to the then (and potentially still ‘as now’) domination of market 
sectors by ‘corporate dinosaurs’, commercial and industrial organizations 
exhibiting limited capability for adaptation to meet a changing environment.   
 
Where historically, individual fortunes have been made opportunistically riding on 
the back of economic turbulence, here we see the potential for the manufacturing 
sector in the European Union, and in Australia, to both ride out the turbulence 
and in the process formulate a new form and structure for industrial relationships 
and the building in of adaptability as a core corporate competency.  The following 
diagram (see Figure 2) provides an outline of a possible parallel analysis 
approach to that of Porter, here focused on causal influences on 
adaptability/agility of an organization rather than Porter’s more aggressive 
elements of bargaining ‘power’ and ‘threats’ of entrants and substitutes (Porter, 
1980).  The emphasis here is more on identifying ‘performance’ related issues 
and an ability to manage an effective response to external influences through 
developing a capability for collaboration and adaptation. 
  
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
 
 
In considering how this ‘Five -Influences Competitive Adaptability Analysis’ model 
may be applied in the case of the European Union Factories of the Future 
collaborative Private-Public-Projects, it is clear that future implementation 
strategies should take cognizance of the strategic positioning and sociological 
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aspects of contemporary manufacturing oriented organizations and their 
connection to the market context in which they are operating (Johnson et al, 
2011).  In particular, there is the need to appraise the potential impact of radical 
or disruptive new technology influences capable of inducing Kuhnian 
paradigmatic change (Kuhn, 1962; Turnbull, 1991) or Gestalt switch like shifts, or 
Constant’s style technological revolution capable of inducing strategic 
discontinuity or’ technology shock’ (Arnold, 2003; Constant, 1984;Tidd & 
Bessant, 2013) in an enterprise’s knowledge, competencies, and underlying 
technology and applications base, regardless of the direction or source of such 
influence (Dedola & Neri, 2006; Christiano, 2003).   
 
Similarly, consideration should be given to determining the potential for 
strategically inducing such shifts.  Such consideration could further provide a 
means of identifying core competencies and strategically relevant capabilities 
that enable enterprises to actively and effectively engage in the transitions 
proposed in the Public-Private-Projects approach.  It can be further argued that 
enterprises already skilled in the development and application of effective 
innovation and change management practices are most likely to find this model 
already reflecting their established modus operandi.   
 
If for example, knowledge assets are to be a significant component in the 
application of new technology and process change, then it will be essential that 
effective knowledge creation strategies, knowledge based tools for process 
design and planning, and innovative methods for knowledge capturing and 
knowledge re-use, are both available to management and are adequately 
resourced and maintained throughout the involved organization(s) (Nonaka & 
Teece, 2001).  This for example could be through identifying the locus or source 
of such knowledge, ascertaining and evaluating its potential value-adding 
capability to the organization, and subsequently its targeted internal distribution 
throughout collaborating organizations.  It will also be necessary that the role of 
knowledge management as a socio-technical function is clearly understood and 
agreed on by management (whether executive or line-based) and supported 
effectively (Coakes,2002).  This is particularly so in relation to ensuring 
appropriate risk mitigation strategies are in place in the planning, creating and 
implementing of new and potentially disruptive technologies and the strategically 
critical area of supporting effective decision making.    
 
A Re-reengineering approach should also endeavour to identify whether 
intensive review of the individual enterprise’s technological knowledge, skills, and 
expertise prior to actioning the introduction of what can best be described as 
radical approach to the widespread diffusion of disruptive innovation, can lead to 
reduced embedded risks of potentially calamitous outcomes at the level of 
individual organizations.  It is not so much that the new science and subsequent 
applied technologies proposed to be developed and/or introduced will fail, rather 
that many of the organizations attempting to implement them may effectively 
implode, or their internal social structures collapse in disarray.  Such is the 
potential outcome for unsuccessful transition from an old and established 
technology base and mode of operations, to a new radical and disruptive 
technology, driven by paradigmatic change.  
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It is essential that successful transitioning strategies be identified and taken into 
account in order to maintain balance between seemingly competing domains of 
influence and practice (Geels & Schot, 2007). Fundamental among these issues 
is the need to identify and integrate corporate core competencies in the areas of: 
knowledge, skills and expertise related to the introduction of advanced new 
technological tools; information and knowledge management strategies and 
processes; the characterization and assembly of coherent data-sets; and the 
detailed modelling of enterprise functions and related activities, resources and 
supply-chains (Tidd & Bessant, 2013).  The introduction of radical and potentially 
disruptive innovation across multiple partnerships and alliances as proposed in 
the European Union’s Digital Factories projects may well provide a context for 
successful integrative knowledge management, as an instrument for change in 
future decision-making.  It may also have the significant advantage of providing 
the prepared and competent user/organization with insights into the enterprise’s 
information and knowledge management assets not hitherto easily available.  
 
It is notable that in the current European Union’s Digital Factories regime, 
collaboration processes are largely structured around ‘project’ based alliances, 
where the evolution of transformative change is seen as the central purpose of 
the alliance/collaboration. Typically, there are 10-12 (and in one instance 19) 
organisations engaged in each of the 26 ICT focussed projects.  These have 
attracted to date a total of €115 million in public funding, following the first two 
‘Calls for Proposals’ under the ICT part of the Factories of the Future and 
initiated through 2010- 2012.  Altogether, 26 major projects involving at least 239 
Organisations distributed across 21 countries and with at least 17 such 
organisations involved across multiple projects (European Commission, 2012).  
Collectively, a significant and possibly unique opportunity to observe a range of 
collaborative alliances collectively engaged in transformative change and the 
strategic repositioning of a major, internationally focussed, industry sector.   
 
What then are the critical areas of performance that could affect organizational 
adaptation, change, and agility in such intensely focussed projects and alliances 
and how may they be measured?  Similarly, what are the critical organizational 
parameters that are impacted on by transition to collaborative/adaptive 
engagement?  In order to address these issues we can use existing theory, 
practice and understandings in strategic management, innovation and change 
management, and organizational theory and practice.  Five specific and 
convergent concepts derived from these theoretical regimes immediately arise: 
the achievement and sustainability of critical mass; clarification of economies and 
diseconomies of scale; identification and attribution of critical success factors; an 
explicit focus on value creation; and an embracing of adaptation and change as a 
cultural norm.  If collaborative alliances are to genuinely institute conditions for 
transformative paradigmatic change, not just within individual enterprises but 
across an industry sector, then these five concepts must be addressed and their 
relationships and linkages understood.   
 
The first two of these concepts, critical mass and economies and diseconomies 
of scale are commonly misunderstood or confused with each other.  In the 
context of the European Union’s collaborative Public-Private-Project activities, 
economies of scale can be seen in the potential to invest in developmental and 
strategic research activity that could only be economically achieved through the 
sharing of resources and bringing together of an extended breadth and scale of 
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knowledge, expertise, and technological resources.  At the same time there is 
also the risk of ‘over-extending’ such scale of activity, triggering a reduction in 
efficiency and reduced overall performance and thus a form of diseconomy of 
scale. Typically, such negative results can be seen where the dimension or scale 
of communications required to maintain progress becomes excessive and starts 
to breakdown or be disruptive.  Similarly, where the ‘cost of association’ between 
players in large alliances or aggregated collaborations becomes prohibitive, then 
the onset of diseconomy of scale can be expected (Johnson et al, 2011).  The 
message here is: beware thinking that more is necessarily better. 
The concept of critical mass is more complex to define in the context of 
collaborative/adaptive alliance building. In general, critical mass refers to a set of 
conditions which, when reached, enables a self sustaining continuum or at the 
very least a predictable response that can be sustained provided the critical 
mass conditions are maintained (Rogers, 2003).  It is this latter interpretation that 
is likely most relevant to organizational contexts.  Even so, it is difficult to 
envisage a common set of conditions that would apply across the European 
Union’s collaborative Public-Private-Project activities or any similar range of 
industry engagements.  However, a possible contender for critical mass would be 
to consider the required level of explicit knowledge, skills, expertise and 
technological resources to enable or initiate the entry conditions for an economy 
of scale.   
 
In turn, there is the interesting prospect of an inverted outcome relative to 
economy of scale.  In an economy of scale relationship the initial entry costs may 
be high but then rapidly diminish with increasing scale of operations or through 
extended applications of the innovation being developed or trialled, whereas the 
sustainment level of critical mass for available skills and expertise is more likely 
to be a rising curve against the maturity of the innovation.  This presents the 
issue of creating a potentially increasing critical mass of required skills and 
expertise as both barrier of entry to new entrants or competitors (under a Porter’s 
Five-Forces analysis approach) and an increasing requirement for growth in skills 
and expertise for sustainment by the existing players!   
 
Association, relationships and linkages are essential components in establishing 
an effective collaboration or alliance between otherwise potentially competing, or 
disassociated organisations.  However, for the collaboration to continue (an 
inherent outcome of the critical mass concept) then it appears that the individual 
players/organizations need to either collectively grow their knowledge base, 
skills, expertise, and access to required technology (the very areas which initially 
brought them together) or to adapt business models and strategic positioning 
modalities to maintain a shared access to the new critical mass levels of 
knowledge, skills, expertise and technology.  Clearly this raises serious questions 
about the long-term sustainability of collaborative ventures outside of extremely 
narrowly focussed ventures requiring unique combinations of knowledge, skills, 
expertise and technology base.   
 
Ascribing critical success factors against collaborative alliances raises multiple 
possible, and potentially measurable, parameters that inherently reflect strategic 
capability for adaptation and organizational agility.  It also requires consideration 
of the strategic dynamics in play and strategic capabilities (Johnson et al, 2011) 
not just at individual enterprise level but also in the broader industry at the level 
of national and international economic environments, and the potential to create 
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and engage in new market spaces or ‘Blue Ocean’ environments (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 2004, 2005).  Identifying those collective areas of knowledge, skills 
and expertise that already exist and are currently ascribed as strategic 
capabilities or significant components supporting an enterprise’s competitive 
position, only partly addresses the construction of critical success factors in a 
collaborative alliance environment such as envisaged in the European Union’s 
‘futures’ view.  It is here that classic ‘multiplicity’ factors in the accumulative 
effects of adding multiple high level skills has the potential to impact positively, 
whilst the prospect of culture clash between collaborating organizations has 
potential for negative impact.  Similarly, an established market acceptance for 
one company’s products and services, or ‘brand’ name, may not necessarily 
transfer to a new collaborative alliance.   
 
Both Porter’s (1985) ‘differentiation’ and Kim and Mauborgne’s (2004, 2005) Blue 
Ocean analysis are of particular interest in attempting to identify potential areas 
for generic critical success factors across potentially adaptable collaborative 
alliances such as proposed in the Factories of the Future projects.  Porter 
primarily identified three drivers for creating competitive advantage: Cost, as an 
element that can for example be driven down through management of economy 
of scale; Differentiation, where specific products or services carry a level of 
perceived value and performance that sets them ahead of competitors; and 
Focus, for example where a company specialises and builds a niche market or 
product range that is extremely difficult for competitors to imitate or effectively 
compete against (Hitt et al, 2011).  Kim and Mauborgne’s Blue Ocean strategy 
effectively uses this concept of creating a strategic gap between products and 
services of otherwise competing companies that in turn creates seemingly still 
waters that run deep, the concept of an uncontested market space.  Products 
and services for which there is, at least at present no viable alternative or 
competitor. 
 
The alternative view, or Red Ocean strategy, is that of where competing products 
and services are driven down in market ‘price’ to the point where cost of 
production equals or is greater than market price.  A condition that faces many 
goods currently manufactured across the European Union, North American and 
Australasian nations.  Interestingly, Kim and Mauborgne also argue that it is from 
the experience of operating within the turbulence of this Red Ocean environment 
that enterprises are able to create the opportunity to adapt and transform 
products, services and even the marketplace itself to affect a new Blue Ocean 
environment. This implies moving out of the aggressive and destructive influence 
of competitive move and counter-move and the debilitating under-tow current of 
competitive cycles to create a region of new market space.   “To win in the future, 
companies must stop competing with each other.  The only way to beat the 
competition is to stop trying to beat the competition… Although some blue 
oceans are created well beyond existing industry boundaries, most are created 
from within red oceans by expanding existing industry boundaries. In blue 
oceans, competition is irrelevant because the rules of the game are waiting to be 
set” (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 4-5).  Whilst subject to at least a degree of 
professional scepticism and contrary to much accepted academic business 
theory and the realities of commercial practice, this viewpoint expounds an 
entirely new paradigm in commercial practice that in fact reflects exactly the 
conditions facing much of Western European, American, and Australasian 
manufacturing industry.  Not simply a new way of moving forward, but an 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Title    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
acknowledgement that existing knowledge, skills, expertise and technological 
prowess, can leverage adaptation and change in ways that create entirely new 
value opportunities in uncontested market space and that breaks the traditional 
nexus with existing market competition, competitors, and established technology 
base.  
 
How then to determine, let alone measure, generic critical success factors for a 
new manufacturing sector strategy based on wide-spread collaboration and 
adaptability.  The following three areas of interest would appear to encompass a 
possible Blue Ocean-like approach, each with an inherent range of measurable 
characteristics. Access to additive knowledge, skills and expertise, technology, 
and product and process design capabilities; development of non-imitative new-
technology, materials, processes, products and value-adding services; and a 
distinctive ‘futures’ market focus.   
 
Conclusions 
A focus on the creation of future new market space for products and services 
provides a powerful engine for innovation and change.  Without this focus on 
adaptation no company is likely to formulate a Blue Ocean strategy other than by 
accident!  Agility at the level of corporate and executive leadership in strategy 
formulation and the tactical allocation of resources to leverage strategic re-
positioning is an essential characteristic and key critical success factor that 
unlocks the resources of the enterprise and focuses them on addressing new 
market space.  In the context of a Re-reengineering approach to building 
collaborative alliances, this in turn places a focus on identifying the elements of 
knowledge, skills, expertise (particularly in product and process design 
capability), technology (as required to achieve or leverage a Blue Ocean style 
strategy), and opportunity for new or re-vitalised products and services. Where 
existing core corporate capabilities and competencies within the organisation do 
not meet these requirements, or inhibitive quantum limitations exist on the 
availability of such, then a collaborative approach that gives access to new 
resources that add to the existing knowledge and skills base (potentially a form of 
transferring of core competencies as intangible resources) can potentially induce 
the necessary conditions for Blue Ocean style strategy development and 
paradigm change.      
 
Implicit in this analysis is the expectation that corporate and executive leadership 
focuses on ensuring an enduring resilience within the organisation, and a 
capacity for learning and adaptation as new ideas, concepts, knowledge and 
skills are introduced.  There is in turn an explicit focus on value creation and an 
embracing of adaptation and change as a cultural norm.   
 
In the world of twenty first century management, flexibility and potential for 
adaptation is a characteristic that differentiates the adaptable knowledge 
focussed learning organization from the corporate dinosaurs of Alvin Toffler’s pre 
dot-com world, transformative organizations that continually adapt, adopt, and 
renew, as and when required.  This reflects a very different notion of industrial or 
technological ‘paradigm’ over the earlier construct of one-size-fits-all with a fixed 
technology-base that changes only under duress, an inherently power-dominated 
model wherein a paradigm is born, grows, becomes dominant, is challenged, and 
subsequently overturned, invariably dramatically.  Against this Kuhnian old-
school dominant paradigm model we can now see at least the semblance of a 
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new form of ‘pluralist’ paradigmatic framework based on cross-relational 
connections between multiple paradigmatic formularisms.  A paradigm model 
wherein the formal structures, processes, and thematics are in a state of 
constant change, or at least readiness to respond to the influence of change 
drivers such as the continuing growth in capabilities and adaptations of new 
technology and its use as a set of technological platforms on which new 
applications are continually being built and distributed.  
 
One message inherent in this argument is that reliance on established practice 
and technological status quo can be fatal, if not viewed with a healthy scepticism 
of its longevity and a clear perception of how and when strategic change can and 
should be introduced. Certainly, all these and more are significant issues to be 
addressed in the context of future strategic positioning of the manufacturing 
industry sector, both in the European Union and elsewhere.  These approaches 
represent the onset of a new collaborative-adaptability paradigm for future 
approaches to the re-development, re-structure and re-enervation of the 
European industrial manufacturing sector and its potential influence on agility in 
global manufacturing. 
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Figure 1.  Porter’s Five Forces Analysis (Adapted from Porter, 1980) 
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Figure 2. Five-Influences Competitive Adaptability Analysis Model 
 
